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Abstract
One of the ethical objections made to inter-generational equity is the violation of consumer
sovereignty. To address this concern, this paper presents a continuous-time Overlapping Gener-
ations Model (OLG) suitable for the treatment of sustainability issues, which distinguishes the
intra- and inter-generational discount factor (see Calvo and Obstfeld, 1988) with taking into
account heterogeneities of time preferences among individuals. We find that consumption for
older patient individuals is always higher than older impatient agents while the social planner
decides to allocate equally the consumption between patient and impatient young individuals.
Along age τ , the consumption of patient old agents always increases relatively, whichs speed
depends on intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Our results show that the consumption of
patient and impatient young individuals are interdependent. We also show that the Hotelling
rule for renewable resources is not affected regardless to the share of patient and impatient
agents in society. Finally, we find that the effect of static increase of the individual discount
rate of a patient or impatient agent on sustainable income depends on the level of aggregate
consumption.
JEL : D63, Q56, O44
Keywords : environment, equity, overlapping generations model, sustainability
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1 Introduction
The debate around discounting, notably concerning the sustainability of growth has intensified
with the prospect of climate change. (see Stern 2006, ; Weitzman 2007, ; Heal 2009) In literature,
social welfare functions are assumed to take into account consumer sovereignty, including also time
preferences. One of the main question that we ask ourselves in this paper is as follows ; how is it
possible to reconcile social preferences that are convenient with inter-generational neutrality and
still use a representative agent models with homogenous time preferences ? One way to cope with
this question is to distinguish the intro-genenerational discount factor from the social planner’s
discount rate, which is equivalent to inter-generational discount factor.
In this paper, we use a continuous-time overlapping generations model (Yaari 1965, Blanchard
and Fisher, 1985 and Calvo and Obstfeld, 1988) with pyhsical capital and renewable natural re-
sources with two-stage optimization. For that reason, our framework is different from other articles
using OLG framework. The framework that we use belongs to Calvo and Obstfeld (1988) which
makes the distinction between intra-generational and inter-generational utility discounting with
solving the analytical model with two-stage dynamic optimization problem. While some other
studies have shown that optimal sustainable economic development with inter-generational equity
is possible with the presence of backstop technology (see Endress et al., 2005, Heal 2000, Ayong
Le Kama 2001.) In these articles, we see that individual impatience is neglected as it is the case
in most of articles in economic literature. Our paper aims mainly to fill this gap and to take into
account not only the aspect of inter-generational equity but also intragenerational equity, without
also neglecting the heterogeneities of time preferences in a society.
Our framework is not only inspiring from Calvo and Obstfeld (1988) but also an adaptation of
Endress et al. (2014) in which authors try to answer to the question that we have asked above.
Endress et al. (2014) treats the individual utility with homogenous time preferences. This frame-
work does not take into account the existing heterogeneities concerning the time preferences among
different agents. In our framework, our main contribution consists of making a distinction between
patient and impatient agents who have different individual discounting factors. This important
extension allows us to analyze the interdependencies concerning the consumption between different
types of agents and also to analyze how the consumption profile of different types of agents change
along τ which shows the age of the given individual. We also show that social planner allocates
equally the consumption of young patient and impatient agents. This equality concerning the con-
sumption is not the case for old agents. For a given age τ , patient old agents consume always more
than impatient old agents at the optimum. Additionnaly, one of the important result to mention in
this paper is that even though there exists heterogeneities in individual time preferences, the model
collapses to a standard infinitely lived agent (ILA) models. Calvo and Obstfeld (1988), Marini and
Scaramozzino (1995) and Schneider et al. (2012) has also showed that the continuous-time OLG
model collapses to standard ILA model but these papers have showed this result for homogeneous
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agents. Also, we show that individual discount rates have an impact on forever sustainable income
which depends on the level of aggregate consumption.
We can observe that the issue of sustainability and inter-generational fairness started to be
treated after the report of theWorld Commission on Environment and Development (1987). Howarth
and Norgaard (1992) examine sustainability and inter-generational fairness with a discrete-time
OLG model in the context of climate change but this article does not treat the consumer sovereignty
problem nor do they make a distinction between individual and inter-generational time preferences
in order to adress to the concern of individual soverignty.
Inter-generational equity and sustainability is one of the very actual debated subjects in eco-
nomics and in many other disciplines like philosophy, sociology and so on. Many of environmental
economists worry that present generations will not leave enough bequests of natural resources for
future generations. Some important philosophers like Kant and Rawls are concerned mainly by the
dictatorship of future on present. Kant (1784) argues that supporting today the burdens of nature
for the sake of later generations is disconcerting. Rawls (1999) is concerned that utilitarianism
may lead us to demand big sacrificies from poorer generations for the benefits of future generations
which will be better off. On the other hand, there is also another reverse-sided dictatorship which
is the dictatorship of present on future. This kind of dictatorship is present when there exists a
positive discounting factor. It is evident that positive discounting is representing an asymmetry
between present and future, especially for very distant future, which is also valid for management
of both renewable and non-renewable resources.
A big part of the neoclassical theories of sustainable growth theory has used positive discounting.
This one is so curious because sustainability issue is deeply linked to inter-generational equity. In
economic literature, inter-generational equity is percieved as giving zero to discount factor, which
implies a zero rate for time preference. For this purpose, a seminal paper Ramsey (1928), defending
the idea that discounting is “ethically indefensible” is often cited by researchers. Samuelson and
Solow (1956) generalize Ramsey (1928) with giving zero to discount factor for any number of capital
goods. Another important study to mention is Solow (1974) in which author pretends to be “more
Rawlsian than Rawls”. In this seminal paper, Solow defends the idea that we must act as if the
pure rate of time preference was equal to zero There exists also another studies which insist on
the importance of inter-generational equity. Heal (2009) considers the positive discounting as a
“discrimination rate across generations”. The optimal growth trajectory of an economy is unsus-
tainable with a positive discount factor, which implies a declining consumption which approaches
to zero for very future generations. So, the positive discounting factor is inconsistent with the idea
of inter-generational equity.
Nonetheless, there are also objections concerning zero utility discounting for inter-generational
equity. Dasgupta (2011) and Heal (1983) argue that in a simple cake-eating problem, if the initial
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level of consumption is low, this level will remain at the same level. So, the economy will be
canalized to a low-level of consumption. Another interesting idea comes from Dasgupta (2011) is
that setting the inter-generational discount factor to zero may provide a unfair advantage for future
generations which will benefit from a higher stocks of knowledge capital. According to Dasgupta
(2011), this problem can be tempered by a huge elasticity of marginal utility which captures the
social tolerance for inter-generational equity.
The remainder of the paper is as follows, in section 2, we introduce the model framework and
our main results. Section 3 characterizes the inter-generational neutrality case with r = 0. In this
section, we also focus on the impact of individual discount rates on forever sustainable income.
Section 4 presents a discussion on the limits of the present paper and proposes some extensions for
further research. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model and Results
We consider an economy made up of overlapping generations of heterogenous individuals in
terms of discount rate, which shows patience level. In a simple model configuration, each generation
contains one patient individual and another impatient individual who live to age N . At each time
t, society is made of these two types of individuals who range in age from 0 to N , and no two
individuals with same patience level have the same age.1
The patient and impatient individual of age τ have consumption good in amount cβ(t, τ) and
cα (t, τ) and enjoy the utility uβ (c (t, τ)) and uα (c (t, τ)) The two type of individuals born at time
T measure remaining lifetime utility, UTβ and UTα , according to the formula where β is the discount
factor for patient and α for the impatient agents. ie. (α > β).
Firstly, as we will give the utility functions at the individual level, these discount factors can
also be interpreted as the intra-generational discount rate. The important point that I want to
stress is that the equations 2.1 and 2.2 show the individual utility of patient and impatient agents.
Also, a very important point is that we use a same utility function for both types of agents for the
sake of simplicity, as it has been also done in Zhong-Li and Löfgren (2000)
UTβ =
ˆ N
τ=0
u (cβ (T + τ, τ)) e
−βτdτ (2.1)
1For example, there exists only one impatient agent who has X years old and another X year old individual who
is patient. To sum up, there exists only 2 individuals who have X years old and one of them is patient and another
is impatient.
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UTα =
ˆ N
τ=0
u (cα (T + τ, τ)) e
−ατdτ (2.2)
So, the social welfare will be a weighted between two types of agent with the constant parameter
δ, which shows the share of patient agents in the whole society. In the aggregated social welfare,
we will introduce a unique inter-generational discount factors which concerns whole society.
The social planner’s aim is to choose the optimal consumption level for each type of agent at
each time cβ(t, τ) and cα (t, τ) ∀t, τ (time path for each type of individual consumption.) subject
to the following differential equations of the two stocks ;
Max
c(t,τ)
W˜ , W˜ = δ
ˆ
∞
T=−N
UTβe
−rT dT + (1− δ)
ˆ
∞
T=−N
UTαe
−rT dT (2.3)
K˙ = F (K,R)− γK − θ(X)R− δ
ˆ N
0
cβ(t, τ)dτ − (1− δ)
ˆ N
0
cα(t, τ)dτ, K(0) given (2.4)
X˙ = G(X)−R, X(0) given (2.5)
Production is given by Y = F (K,R) where K represents the capital stock which depreciates
with a constant rate γ. R is the extraction from a renewable resource which grows at rate G(X).
There exist also extraction costs, which is stock-dependant unit cost θ(X). We don’t put any special
assumptions about these functions.
It can be possible to solve this problem as an optimal control problem. We can easily see that
the two equations of motion show the rate of variation in terms of pure time t. The application of
the Maximum Principle for this problem can be simplified by reformulating the objective function
in terms of time t, instead of generational index, T . For this one, we pass from the separability
of social welfare by individual to separability by time period through a transformation of the two
time variable systems.
To sum up, we switch from (T, τ) to (t, τ) by puting T = t − τ and we maintain τ = τ . This
kind of reformulation also exists in (Burton, 1993) in which the author make a welfare analysis
involving both individual and generational discount factors. Vi represents the aggregate utility of
each type of agent.
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So, let us define the aggregate utility for each agent before reformulating our optimization
program ;
Vβ(C) =
ˆ N
0
u((cβ(t, τ))e
−(β−r)τdτ (2.6)
Vα(C) =
ˆ N
0
u((cα(t, τ))e
−(α−r)τdτ (2.7)
So, the new optimization problem is as follows ;
Note that (We also show how we derive 2.8 from 2.3 in Appendix 6 part a) )
Max, W,W = δ
ˆ
∞
0
Vβ(C)e
−rτdτ + (1− δ)
ˆ
∞
0
Vα(C)e
−rτdτ (2.8)
K˙ = F (K,R)− γK − θ(X)R− C, K(0) given (2.9)
X˙ = G(X)−R, X(0) given (2.10)
where Vβ (C) and Vα (C) show the aggregate utility of patient and impatient agents respectively.
We show rigourously how we derive the aggregate utility function V (C) in Appendix 6 part b).
Max, W,W =
ˆ
∞
0
(δVβ(C) + (1− δ)Vα(C)) e
−rtdt =
ˆ
∞
0
V (C)e−rtdt (2.11)
In the following section, we explain how to solve the maximization problem in two stages.
2.1 How to solve this problem in two stages ?
In the first stage of the maximization problem, the social planner will weight V with δ in order
to maximize the utility Vi of each type of agent. We write as it follows ;
MaxW,W = δ
ˆ N
0
u((cβ(t, τ))e
−(β−r)τdτ + (1− δ)
ˆ N
0
u((cα(t, τ))e
−(α−r)τdτ (2.12)
s.t δ
ˆ N
0
cβ(t, τ)dτ + (1− δ)
ˆ N
0
cα(t, τ)dτ ≤ C (2.13)
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C represents the aggregate level of output for consuption for whole society. This problem can be
solved as a two stage maximization program. In the first stage, we establish a relationship between
c ∗ (t, 0) and the optimal path of individual consumption c ∗ (t, τ) for both type of agents. The
second stage consists on the solution of the progam 2.8.
First, we put the first order conditions from our maximization problem that maximizes V . To
solve it, we write the Lagrangian ;
L = δ
ˆ N
0
u((cβ(t, τ))e
−(β−r)τdτ + (1− δ)
ˆ N
0
u((cα(t, τ))e
−(α−r)τdτ
+ λ
[
C − δ
ˆ N
0
cβ(t, τ)dτ − (1− δ)
ˆ N
0
cα(t, τ)dτ
]
(2.14)
An interior optimum is given by the following necessary conditions :
∂L
∂cβ
= u
′
(cβ(t, τ))e
−(β−r)τ − λ = 0 (2.15)
∂L
∂cα
= u
′
(cα(t, τ))e
−(α−r)τ − λ = 0 (2.16)
From 2.15 and 2.16, we find the following relation ;
u
′
(cβ(t, τ))
u′(cα(t, τ))
= e−(α−β)τ (2.17)
Proposition 1. With a given age τ , older patient individuals consume always more than older
impatient agents regardless to the share of impatient agents in society.
Proof. See equation 2.17
Before passing to the explanation of our proposition, we find useful to give a definition of old
and a young agent. We suppose that agents with age τ = 0 are considered to be young and other
agents with age τ different from zero are old agents.
With analyzing 2.17, we can see that the consumption of old patient individuals is relatively
higher than its of impatient individuals when the difference between the individual discount factor
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of old patient (β) and impatient agents (α) is bigger. The fact that old patient agents consume
more can be explained by other factors that are exogenous to our model. Patient old agents, as
they are patient can have savings from past. So, in this case, it can be plausible for those agents
to consume more at a given age τ .
Proposition 2. Consumption of patient old agents increases according to consumption of im-
patient old agents with age τ .
Proof. See equation 2.17
Another interesting point to look at is the consumption profile of different types of individual
along age τ . With given individual discount rates, we can see easily that individual consumption
of old patient agents increases according to its level for old impatient agents. We can explain this
situation with the fact that patient agents conserve more of their budget for ulterior consumption.
Proposition 3. Consumption of patient old agents increases less fastly along age τ when
intertemporal elasticity of substition is lower.
In order to see this one, we replace the marginal utility by the utility function that we have
specified 2.24 ;
[
cβ (t, τ)
cα (t, τ)
]
−θ
= e−(α−β)τ (2.18)
This is a quite intuitive result. The consumption of patient agents is less sensitive to discount
factor when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is lower. So, in the case where the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution is lower, the consumption of old patient agents will increase less
fastly along age τ .
In order to analyze the consumption decisions concerning young individuals, we give τ = 0 as
it has been used in Endress et al. (2014), we rewrite 2.15 and 2.16;
u
′
(cβ(t, 0)) = λ (2.19)
u
′
(cα(t, 0)) = λ (2.20)
So we find the following relation ;
u
′
(cβ (t, 0)) = u
′
(cα (t, 0)) (2.21)
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Proposition 4. At the social optimum, there exists a constant relationship between the marginal
utility of patient young agents and the marginal utility of impatient young agents, which implies also
that the social planner allocates the consumption equally between patient young and impatient young
individuals.
In this case, we see clearly that the marginal utility of young patient agents is equivalent to the
marginal utility of young impatient agents, which implies that the social planner allocates equally
the consumption between patient and impatient agents at the age τ = 0, which is the born date.2
We can interpret this result as to be convenient with equity between young individuals. Logically,
at the date of born 0, social planner is not capable to distinguish if one agent is patient or impatient.
So, it can be plausible that he allocates the consumption equally between young agents at the age
τ = 0.
2.2 How the consumption changes between young and old agents ?
In order to see how the allocation of the consumption between old and young agents changes
according to the age and individual discount rates, we are combining seperately 2.15 - 2.19 and 2.16
- 2.20, we have ;
u
′
(cβ(t, 0))e
(β−r)τ = u
′
(cβ(t, τ)) (2.22)
u
′
(cα(t, 0))e
(α−r)τ = u
′
(cα(t, τ)) (2.23)
In the following part, we will treat three cases concerning intra-generational and inter-generational
discount factors. This analysis will permit us to see how a young generation can consume a bigger
part of society’s aggregate consumption and vice versa. We will treat the case for patient agents.
The same analysis is also valid for impatient agents.
Proposition 5. The consumption profile of different generations along age τ differs according
to case 1 and case 3.
Case 1 : β > r
In this case, we will have u
′
(cβ (t, τ)) > u
′
(cβ (t, 0)) which implies cβ (t, τ) < cβ (t, 0) Each
generations consumption is determined by the difference between individual discount rates of each
type of agents and inter-generational discount rate. As the marginal utility of old patient agents is
higher, young patient agents consume a larger part of the aggregate consumption.
Case 2 : β = r
2Formally, we have cβ (t, 0) = cα (t, 0)
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One can easily see that marginal utility of different generations are equal which means that
all generations will enjoy the same marginal utility of consumption. As we have u
′
(cβ (t, τ)) =
u
′
(cβ (t, 0)), the consumption of old patient agents is equal to the consumption of young patient
agents.
Case 3 : β < r
In the following case, we will have u
′
(cβ (t, τ)) < u
′
(cβ (t, 0)). It is evident that young patient
agents will have the chance to consume a smaller part of the aggregate consumption.
It is also important to stress out that consumption profile of different generations will have
different profiles along age τ according to the case 1 and case 3 that we have analysed. For example,
in the first case, as the individual discount rate is higher than inter-generational discount factor,
the marginal utility of the old generation is higher, which implies that young generation consume a
larger share of the aggregate consumption along τ . We will have the symmetric result for the case
3 in which the marginal utility of the old generation is lower, which shows that the old generation’s
part of consumption in aggregate consumption is higher.
As we have different types of agents. It could be so interesting to focus on a case in which
we have β < r < α, which implies that patient agents would have a lower discount rate than the
social planner’s discount rate and impatient agents would have higher discount rate. So, in this
case, the individual consumption profile of old patients and young patients in the society would be
symmetric along τ . Recall that we don’t treat this kind of case, which would be in contradiction
with our section about inter-generational equity in which we treat the inter-generational discount
factor as to be equal to zero.
Following the very standard approach in the neoclassical sustainable growth theory, we assume
that the utility function takes the constant elasticity of marginal utility form. This assumption is
necessary in order to have a balanced growth path. We use the following utility function ;
u (ci (t, τ)) = − (ci (t, τ))
−(θ−1)
, θ > 1 (2.24)
This one implies at the optimum ;
c∗β (t, τ) = c
∗
β (t, 0) e
−(β−r)τ/θ and c∗α (t, τ) = c
∗
α (t, 0) e
−(α−r)τ/θ (2.25)
We write the aggregate utility function of the society V (C) as a function of C as it follows ;
We provide the proof in Appendix 6 (part b) ;
V (C) = −
[
C
M
]
−(θ−1)
D (2.26)
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where M and D represent the aggregation coefficicent and constant parameter respectively
which we present in Appendix 6 (part b) (See equation 6.4 and 6.5)
In the second stage of the maximization problem, we write the current-value Hamiltonian for
maximizing V (C) ;
H = V (C) + λ [F (K,R)− γK − θ (X)R− C] + ψ (G (X)−R) (2.27)
We generate the Keynes-Ramsey condition and the Hotelling rule for renewable resources ;
V ′′ (C)
V ′ (C)
C˙ = r − (FK − γ) (2.28)
(FR − θ (X)) =
1
FK − γ
(
F˙R + (FR − θ (X))G
′
(X)− θ
′
(X)G (X)
)
(2.29)
As an important result, we can observe that the aggregation coefficient M and constant param-
eter D cancel out when we derive the Keynes-Ramsey condition. This means that the aggregate
quantities are governed by generational discount rate r and not by individual discount rates α and
β.
Proposition 6. Regardless to share of patient and impatient agents in the society, which changes
the share of consumption at the aggregate level between these two type of agents in terms of patience
level, the Hotelling rule is not affected.
Calvo and Obstfeld (1988), Marini and Scaramozzino (1995) show that the continous time
OLG modelling collapses to infinitely-lived representative agent model for the case of homogeneous
agents. In this paper, we have additionnaly showed that even in the case with heterogeneity in
time-preferences, the continous-time OLG model reduces to standard representative agent model.
With computing the derivatives for 2.28 the Keynes-Ramsey condition can be written as ;
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FK − γ = θ
C˙
C
+ r (2.30)
The conditions that we have found for Keynes-Ramsey and Hotelling show that in an OLG
model, the optimum trajectory of the aggregate consumption and the resource extraction path is
governed by inter-generational discount rate r and not by intra-generational discount factors but
this result does not mean that intra-generational discount can not factor into consumption decisions.
In the steady state, we have ;
C˙ = 0⇒ FK = (γ + r) (2.31)
So, before reaching the steady-state, we would have FK > (γ + r) which implies C˙ > 0.
The fact that two conditions that we have given above are not governed by intra-generational
discount does not mean that this one fails to factor into consumption decisions. With returning to
first stage of the optimization problem, we can make comparative static analysis in order to see how
the intra-generational discount affects the consumption decisions.
From Appendix 6 c), comparative static analysis yield
∂c∗α (t, 0)
∂α
=
∂M˜
∂α
C∗ (t) > 0 (2.32)
∂c∗β (t, 0)
∂β
=
∂M˜
∂β
C∗ (t) > 0 (2.33)
∂c∗α (t, 0)
∂β
=
∂M˜
∂β
C∗ (t) > 0 (2.34)
∂c∗β (t, 0)
∂α
=
∂M˜
∂α
C∗ (t) > 0 (2.35)
Proposition 7. When the intra-generational discount factor of impatient agents incereases
according to inter-generational discount rate, not only the consumption of young impatient agents
increases, but also the consumption of young patient agents increases. This one is also valid for the
intra-generational discount factor of patient agents.
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This result gives us interesting insights concerning the allocation of consumption across different
types of young individuals. Young agents with different discounting factor are all in interaction.
This corresponds also to economic reality. The same cohorts in terms of age influence each oth-
ers consumption. This result is also in the same line with Cowan et al. (2004) who argue that
consumption of an agent is affected by peer group of similar consumers.
3 Intergenerational Neutrality
Discounting favors present generations at the expense of the future generations. (Ramsey (1928))
So, it is possible to manage this ethical question in a way that we give zero as value for discount
factor. The technical problem with this one is that welfare function is immediately infinite for
any consumption path. So, the consumption pat will not converge to zero. This problem can be
overcome by using the specification proposed by Ramsey (1928).
Note also that, contrary to the first section, we assume in this section that there does not exist
extraction costs for renewable resources. This assumption permits us to not deal with tedious com-
putations concerning our anaylsis of the impacts of individual discount rate on forever sustainable
income.
We define the following maximization problem ;
Max
Ct
W, W =
ˆ
∞
t=0
(
V (Ct)− V (Cˆ)
)
dt (3.1)
where V (Cˆ) is the bliss point or golden rule of consumption.
The new Hamiltonian of our maximization problem is the following ;
H =
[
V (Ct)− V (Cˆ)
]
+ λ [F (K,R)− γK − C] + ψ (G (X)−R) (3.2)
The hamiltonian is time-independant, which we can name an autonomous control problem. So,
we will have ∂H/∂t = 0. In the optimal path, ∂H/∂t = ∂H/∂τ = 0, which yields H =0. We
reformulate the program as follows ;
V (Cˆ) = V (Ct) + λ [F (K,R)− γK − C] + ψ (G (X)−R) = V (Ct) + λK˙ + ψX˙ (3.3)
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V (Cˆ) = −
(
C
M
)
−(θ−1)
D + λK˙ + ψX˙ (3.4)
In this way, we have found the forever sustainable income which is the maximum value of
social utility in any time t, which is equal to the value of consumption, net investment and natural
resources. The latter gives also a definition of Gross Net National Income, (GNNP) which is defined
by Weitzman (1976). In this case of inter-generational neutrality, not only the income is sustained
forever but also the income does not have a declining profile as it was the case in the neoclassical
growth models with positive discounting rate.
Proposition 8. The overall effect of static increase of individual discount rate on forever
sustainable income depends on the level of aggregate consumption of society.
Case 1 : Negative effect on forever sustainable income
∂λ
∂x
< 0 and
∂V (C)
∂x
< 0 if C (t) <
δM
(θ − 1)D
Case 2 : Ambigous effect on forever sustainable income
∂λ
∂x
< 0 and
∂V (C)
∂x
> 0 if C (t) >
δM
(θ − 1)D
where x = β − r. We recall that this analysis is also valid for y = α− r, which is for impatient
agents.
Proof. See Appendix d)
It is worth mentioning that the individual discount rate has an impact on sustainable income.
We find that there exists two different channels concerning this impact.
First case is when the aggregate consumption is under a threshold,3 the increase in individual
discount rate of patient or impatient agents, which implies a higher share of aggregate consumption
3We ﬁnd analytically this threshold.
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for young generations in the case α > β > r4 makes decrease the aggregate utility of consumption
V (C). In this first case, there exists a second channel which concerns λ. When we look at equations
2.15 and 2.16, it is so easy to see that a static increase of individual discount rates make decrease
the shadow price of capital λ. So, the overall effect of a static increase of individual discount factor
makes decrease the forever sustainable income of the economy.
Secondly, when the aggregate consumption is above a threshold, the static increase of individual
discount rates in the case α > β > r makes increase the aggregate utility of consumption V (C).
The second channel confirms always that a static increase of individual discount rates make decrease
the shadow price of capital λ. As a nutshell, the overall effect of the static increase of individual
discount rates is ambigous.
Concerning the first case, we see that when the aggregate consumption level is under the thresh-
old, the fact that young individuals consume more than old individuals makes the forever sustainable
income less. This result is quite interesting and gives theoretical support for some surveys about
environmental concern of different age groups. Denniss (2005) defends the idea that old people care
more about environment than young people in Australia with a data containing 56344 respondents.
4 Further extensions and Discussion
It is sure that this paper has some limits. One of the important limit is that we are using additive
utility functions in the sense that utility of individuals at date t depends neither on past nor on
future. So, as it is possible to see at the first stage of our optimization probem, whatever the date
t, social planner takes the same decision at all possible t. In order to visualize this one, we draw
the following graphic ;
4It is possible to say that generally agents are more impatient than the social planner. So, this assumption can
ben plausible in many cases.
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It is straightforward to say that social planner maximizes the utility of old and young generations
at date t and does not take into account what it has happened in past concerning the consumption
of different generations. So, even if there were inequalities for consumption among generations at
past dates, the social planner does anything in order to compensate this inequality of consumption
between generations. Further research must aim to focus on this limit of our model. For this
extension, one can benefit from Obstfeld (1990) with using recursive utility functions which we can
express in a discrete-time model with a Bellman equation as follows ;
For the moment, we limit our representation to a homogeneous individual.
U (Ct) = u (ct) + U (Ct+1) e
−θ(ct) (4.1)
where θ(c) is the discount factor depending on consumption. To give a concise idea, the time-
additive setup that we have used in this paper implies θ (c) = θ, which is a constant. Note that
θ (c) and u (c) are twice differentiable and strictly increasing and concave functions.
This functional form is a member of recursive utility functionals, which obeys ;
U (Ct) =W (ct, U (Ct+1)) (4.2)
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It is also possible to convert the discrete-time framework to continuous-time framework according
to Obstfeld (1990) ;
U (C0) =
ˆ
∞
0
u (ct) e
[−
´ t
0
θ(c(s)ds)]dt (4.3)
C0 shows the consumption path which originates from t = 0. Notice also that 4.3 is the
continuous-time analogue of the recursivity condition that we have defined in 4.1.
From this extension with non-additive time-preferences, we anticipate that marginal utility from
consumption of different types of individuals on a given date will also depend on the consumption
on other dates. For example, it is plausible to anticipate that consumption rises during a high
interest rate. The main difference in this approach will be that the long-run target level of wealth is
attended to be more well-defined. This one is also intuitive because when social planner optimizes
the utility of different individuals at a date t, with non-additive time preferences, he can take into
account the utility of ulterior periods like t+ 1.
5 Conclusion
The analysis of different types of individual discount rate has given different results that Endress
et al. (2014) did not find. Our results has showed how can these heterogeneities on individual
discount factors have various impacts on consumption profile of generations. An interesting finding
is that the consumption profile between impatient and patient agents of same generation and of
different generations does not only depend on the level of individual discount rate but also depends
on the level of individual discount rate relative to social planner’s discount rate and on age τ . From
the first-stage of our optimization problem, it is also easy to see that at the optimum, the allocation
of consumption between different types of agents within the young generation is equal while for
the older generations, it is optimal that patient agents consume more than impatient agents. We
also found that the Hotelling rule for renewable resources is not affected regardless to the share of
patient and impatient agents across the society. As an another interesting result, the fact that the
static increase of the discount rate of patient agents, which implies an increase in consumption of
patient agents leads also to an increase of consumption of young impatient agents. This kind of
interaction between similar agents in termes of age is also supported by Cowan (2004).
This paper has also investigated sustainability issues by a continuous-time OLG model. We
show analytically that forever sustainable income is also affected by individual discount factors but
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the effect of the individual discount rates are not certain and depend on the level of aggregate
consumption of society.
As we have discussed on the previous section, our setup with time-additive preferences has some
limits that social planner does not take into account the utility of other time periods when he
maximizes the utility at a given date t. Extending our model to non-additive time preferences à la
Epstein (see Epstein 1986 and Obstfeld 1990) is highly desirable and planned in our future research
program.
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6 Appendix
a) We replace 2.1 and 2.2 in 2.3, so we have ;
W˜ = δ
ˆ
∞
0
ˆ N
τ
uβ (c (t, τ)) e
−βτe−r(t−τ)dτdt
+ (1− δ)
ˆ
∞
0
ˆ N
τ
uα (c (t, τ)) e
−ατe−r(t−τ)dτdt with T = t− τ (6.1)
We can distinguish quickly the V (Cβ) and V (Cα) in this expression.
u (ci (t, τ)) = − (ci (t, τ))
−(θ−1)
, θ > 1 (6.2)
c∗β (t, τ) = c
∗
β (t, 0) e
−(β−r)τ/θ and c∗α (t, τ) = c
∗
α (t, 0) e
−(α−r)τ/θ (6.3)
b) We can substitute the each equation of 6.3 in the consumption constraint of 2.14 to solve for
the aggregate consumption of patient and impatient agents.
Cβ(t) = δC =
ˆ N
0
c∗β (t, τ) dτ =
ˆ N
0
(
c∗β (t, 0)
)
e−(β−r)τ/θdτ =
(
θ
(
1− e(β−r)N/θ
)
β − r
)
c∗β (t, 0) =M1c
∗
β (t, 0)
(6.4)
Cα(t) = (1−δ)C =
ˆ N
0
c∗α (t, τ) dτ =
ˆ N
0
(c∗α (t, 0)) e
−(α−r)τ/θdτ =
(
θ
(
1− e(α−r)N/θ
)
α− r
)
c∗α (t, 0) =M2c
∗
α (t, 0)
(6.5)
where C =M1c
∗
β (t, 0) +M2c
∗
α (t, 0)
M1 =
(
θ(1−e(β−r)N/θ)
β−r
)
and M2 =
(
θ(1−e(α−r)N/θ)
α−r
)
From 2.21 ;
c∗α (t, 0) = c
∗
β (t, 0) (6.6)
Now,
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V (C) =Max
[
δ
ˆ N
0
u (cβ (t, τ)) e
−(β−r)τdτ + (1− δ)
ˆ N
0
u (cα (t, τ)) e
−(α−r)τdτ
]
= δ
ˆ N
0
u
(
c∗β (t, τ)
)
e−(β−r)τdτ + (1− δ)
ˆ N
0
u (c∗α (t, τ)) e
−(α−r)τdτ (6.7)
We write ;
u
(
c∗β (t, τ)
)
= −
(
c∗β (t, τ)
)
−(θ−1)
= −
(
c∗β (t, 0)
)
−(θ−1)
(
e−(β−r)τ/N
)
−(θ−1)
(6.8)
u (c∗α (t, τ)) = − (c
∗
α (t, τ))
−(θ−1)
= − (c∗α (t, 0))
−(θ−1)
(
e−(α−r)τ/N
)
−(θ−1)
(6.9)
We plug 6.8 and 6.9 in 6.7 ;
V (C) = −
[
δ
[
c∗β (t, 0)
−(θ−1)
ˆ N
0
e(β−r)(1−θ)τ/θe−(β−r)τdτ
]
+ (1− δ)
[
c∗α (t, 0)
−(θ−1)
ˆ N
0
e(α−r)(1−θ)τ/θe−(α−r)τdτ
]]
(6.10)
where
´ N
0
e(β−r)(1−θ)τ/θe−(β−r)τdτ =
´ N
0
e−(β−r)τ/θdτ
We replace the term ; c∗α (t, 0) = c
∗
β (t, 0) in 6.10
V (C) = − [cβ (t, 0)]
−(θ−1)
[
δ
[(
θ
(
1− e(β−r)N/θ
)
β − r
)]
+ (1− δ)
[(
θ
(
1− e(α−r)N/θ
)
α− r
)]]
(6.11)
where D =
[
δ
[(
θ(1−e(β−r)N/θ)
β−r
)]
+ (1− δ)
[(
θ(1−e(α−r)N/θ)
α−r
)]]
V (C) = −
[
c∗β (t, 0)
]
−(θ−1)
D (6.12)
With using 6.6, we can write C = c∗β (t, 0) [M1 +M2] = c
∗
β (t, 0) [M ] with definingM =M1+M2
We will have
V (C) = −
[
C
M
]
−(θ−1)
D (6.13)
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c) In the previous section, we had found C = c∗β (t, 0) [M1 +M2] = c
∗
β (t, 0) [M ]
We prove that ∂M˜∂β > 0 where M = M1 +M2 and M˜ =
1
M =
1
M1+M2
. In order to not face to
tedious derivative computations, we write ;
M1 = θ
(
1− e
−bx
)
/x (6.14)
where x = β − r , b = N/θ
M2 = θ
(
1− e−by
)
/y (6.15)
where y = α− r
∂M1
∂x
=
θ (1 + bx) e−bx − 1
θ (1− e−bx)
2 (6.16)
It is sufficient to look at the sign of the numerator. The term (1 + bx) e−bx attains 1 only if
x = 0. Therefor for x 6= 0, the numerator is negative.
This yields ;
∂M1
∂x
=
θ (1 + bx) e−bx − 1
θ (1− e−bx)
2 < 0 (6.17)
The same reasoning is valid also for M2. So, in this case,
∂M
∂x =
∂M1
∂x < 0. As we know that
∂M
∂x < 0, we can deduce that
∂M˜
∂x > 0
d) We take the derivative of V (C) with respect to x = β − r ;
∂V (C)
∂x
= (θ − 1)
[
M
C
]
−θ
D
(
θ (1 + bx) e−bx − 1
)
θ (1− e−bx)
2 −
[
M
C
]
−(θ−1) δ
[
θ (1 + bx) e−bx − 1
]
θ (1− e−bx)
2 (6.18)
It is possible to see that ∂V (C)∂x > 0 if ;
C >
δM
(θ − 1)D
(6.19)
25
